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Abstract
This commentary engages with Suzuki and colleagues’ analysis about the ambiguity of multi-stakeholder discourses
in the United Nations (UN) Political Declaration of the 3rd High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the
Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (HLM-NCDs), suggesting that blurring between public and
private sector in this declaration reflects broader debates about multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) and publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) in health governance. We argue that the ambiguity between the roles and responsibilities
of public and private actors involved may downplay the role (and regulation) of conflicts of interest (COI) between
unhealthy commodity industries and public health. We argue that this ambiguity is not simply an artefact of the
Political Declaration process, but a feature of multi-stakeholderism, which assumes that commercial actors´ interests
can be aligned with the public interest. To safeguard global health governance, we recommend further empirical and
conceptual research on COI and how it can be managed.
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T

he increasing prominence of multi-stakeholder fora
and partnerships in global health1-4 raises questions
about how to identify and manage potential tensions
between private sector and public heath interests. In their
analysis of stakeholder influence on the United Nations (UN)
Political Declaration of the 3rd High-Level Meeting of the
General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of NonCommunicable Diseases (HLM-NCDs), Suzuki et al highlight
how the drafting of the Political Declaration was marked by
ambiguity and confusion about the participation of nonstate actors in health governance. Their findings suggest that
the involvement of the private sector in multi-stakeholder
consultations is likely to frustrate efforts to develop coherent
political commitments to addressing the structural drivers
of NCDs. In this commentary, we argue that the ambiguity
identified by Suzuki et al in their analysis of the interactive
consultations over the UN HLM-NCDs is a defining and
strategic feature of multi-stakeholder discourses. Ambiguity
blurs the contrast between public and private sectors, and
minimises potential tensions between commercial interests
and public health interests.
While Suzuki et al make an analytical distinction between
‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approaches
to health governance, we suggest that multi-stakeholder
discourses blur the distinction between state, civil society and
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private sector actors; and in the process draw attention away
from private sector influence in health governance. In this
commentary, we argue that ambiguity may be strategically
used to downplay the identification and management of
conflicts of interest (COI) within collaborative modes of
health governance.
When engaging with the private sector, particularly
unhealthy commodity industries (eg, alcohol, ultraprocessed foods and sugar-sweetened beverages, industrial
agribusiness) – hereafter commercial actors –, multilateral
organisations should consider the potential risks of such
interactions for global health governance. These commercial
actors have consistently used similar policy frames to push for
their economic interests that rarely align with health-related
outcomes.4-6 We need to better understand how public health
mandates are discussed and decided upon, and how policies
are developed to ensure transparency and equity in such
governance arrangements, where non-state actors interact at
different jurisdictional levels.4,7
Collaboration and Partnership: The Logic of Multistakeholderism

In reviewing the UN HLM, Suzuki et al make a conceptual
distinction between ‘whole-of-government’ approaches to
public health – which they describe as coordination across
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government agencies –, and differentiate this from ‘wholeof-society’ or ‘multi-stakeholder’ governance in which nonstate actors (including the private sector) are consulted over
the development of policy instruments and solutions to
address public health issues. However, while the authors are
clear about the distinction between state-centred and multistakeholder approaches, they note that the language of the
UN HLM Political Declaration blurs the contrast between
non-state actors.
While supporting this distinction, we would argue that what
Suzuki and colleagues’ identify as the ‘interchangeability’ of
these terms in the UN HLM-NCDs Declaration symbolises a
wide-ranging commitment to multi-stakeholder partnership
(MSP) and public-private partnerships (PPPs) as key
mechanisms to achieving health and development goals.
In this sense, the UN HLM-NCDs Declaration reflects a
broader logic of multi-stakeholder inclusivity, modelled on
policy deliberation and dialogue between state and nonstate actors.8 Importantly, this logic reinforces the idea that
engagement processes should involve the private sector
(including commercial actors) as a core stakeholder in the
design and implementation of policy. The implication for
health governance is that important differences interests
and motivations between civil society and commercial
actors engagement are minimised and collapsed within
MSP and PPPs. Building on Suzuki and colleagues’ analysis,
we would suggest that this observed ambiguity in the roles,
responsibilities and mandates of non-state actors is not simply
an artefact of the UN HLM-NCDs process, but a feature of
multi-stakeholderism in which it is assumed that commercial
actors´ interests can be aligned with the public interest.
Marginalising Conflict of Interest
In addition to the ambiguity between types of stakeholder
involved in the HLM hearings, Suzuki et al note how
identifying and managing COIs between commercial and
public health interests was not incorporated in the final
document, despite ‘strong advocacy from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), academic institutions and some
Member States.’ This concern was articulated by one civil
society organisation, which noted that ‘the declaration
encourages multi-sectoral partnerships, but the risks
associated with COIs are mentioned only briefly.’ With this
outcome, the Declaration illustrates that the perception of
COI is peripheral to health governance; and it is illustrative
of wider fault-lines in global health. As the authors argue, the
promotion of MSP and PPPs in the absence of tools to manage
COI, ‘is the worst possible combination from the perspective
of many NGOs and public health advocates.’ We would argue
that the elastic, malleable qualities of multi-stakeholderism
can be purposefully constructed to downplay the significance
of COI in the process of policy-making.9
Suzuki and colleagues’ findings on the issue of COI are
particularly worrying. This resonates with previous work
on this topic showing that in other public consultations,
commercial actors saw the topic as redundant and
unnecessary6 and it was ‘effectively addressed’ by individual
disclosures; and that such guidelines will limit the knowledge,
1216

expertise, and resources the private sector can contribute to
public health programmes.6 Nevertheless, NGOs and Member
States have shown support for UN tools developed to address
COI. 7
Two issues arise from the evidence now available: (a) the
implications of not having an unambiguous understanding
of what a COI is; and (b) the issues arising from the
mischaracterisation of COI as a peripheral concern which can
be straightforwardly managed through disclosure.
First, the divergence of understandings of COI suggests
that clarity is urgently needed.10 In the sphere of public health
governance, experts should aim to build a consensus for a
particular reason: the actors involved will intrinsically have
divergent interests, but we need a clear understanding of
when and how interactions enable a convergence on a primary
interest, without being jeopardised by any other competing
interest; and more importantly who should be included in
consultative processes for global health policy-making.9 One
way forward to reach clarity on the concepts of COI and
‘commercial influence’ could be through concept mapping,11
an approach which enables the collection of various actors’
ideas to produce a structured conceptual framework, similar
to previous exercises on integrity principles in population
health.
Second, disclosure as a mechanism to address COI has
been the predominant solution among MSP, PPPs or ‘wholeof-society’ approaches. We agree with the authors and other
scholars12 that disclosure is not sufficient to address or avoid
(institutional) COI or corporate interference in nutrition
policy-making when the institutional structure of policymaking is the overarching issue. Nevertheless, ‘whole-ofsociety’ and ‘multi-stakeholder’ approaches are the dominant
model of health governance. We are faced with questions about
MSP’s benefits and appropriateness. Multilateral agencies need
to urgently clarify and address issues around MSPs and PPPs
in public health. Rethinking the terms of engagement with
commercial sector actors require posing questions such as:
(a) Can they be meaningfully involved where their fiduciary
duties to shareholders conflict with the values/aims of the
initiative/programme at hand? (b) What principles or codes
of conduct will be implemented? (c) What actors will monitor
compliance and hold private sector actors to account? (d) How
will transparency of NGO funding be ensured to mitigate any
potential vested or conflicting interests? (e) How to integrate
into these arrangements the right to health: adequate access to
healthy food and a healthy environment? (f) How to include
the genuine concern of addressing vulnerable populations
and achieving related human rights?
The ‘whole-of-society’ or ‘multi-stakeholder’ approach
encompasses, as Suzuki et al mention, cooperation among
state and non-state actors, including civil society and the
private sector. This raises questions about the extent to which
tensions and competing interests can be reconciled in this
model of governance, and what tools and design choices
can effectively regulate COI in public health policy. Can
any potential negative impacts be mitigated and, if so, how?
Are some commercial actors better suited for engagement
than others? Or should engagement take the same shape as
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the non-engagement with the tobacco industry under the
World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control?13 What do Member States and, more
importantly, their citizens gain from such partnerships, and
what do they give up? What do partners stand to gain or
lose? What processes for transparency and accountability are
required and followed?
Discussion
Suzuki and colleagues’ work gives us important insights into
the tip of the iceberg surrounding structural problems of the
‘multi-stakeholder’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approaches in the
global health agenda. Their work resonates with previous
research exploring how food industry actors have attempted
to shape debates around NCD policy and COI through multistakeholder arrangements and PPPs.4-6 We argue that the
ambiguity of the language in the Political Declaration has
been a tool to downplay the significance of wider structural
and institutional conflicts between commercial interests and
public health. While public consultations by the UN are based
on the principles of inclusiveness, plurality, and democracy,
they have legitimised the participation of powerful
commercial actors whose health-harming interests may shape
outcome documents. We suggest that, as it is, the ambiguous
framing of multi-stakeholderism reflected in statements from
private sector actors as well as the final Declaration, risks
negating the importance of COI in favour of collaboration.
This observed ambiguity in the roles, responsibilities and
mandates of non-state actors is not simply an artefact of the
UN HLM process, but a feature of multi-stakeholderism in
which it is assumed that commercial actors’ interests can be
aligned with the public interest.
Amidst current trends of privatisation of health, the
proliferation of PPPs at national and global levels; and
with private financing of multilateral organisations by
food, beverage and agribusiness for the ‘food systems
transformation,’ such as the WHO Foundation and the Food
System Summit, global health governance processes need
much more scrutiny than ever before.3
Mechanisms and tools to safeguard the public’s interests
have been designed, such as the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control point 5.3 or the draft tool to prevent and
manage conflict of interest in nutrition policy under the
WHO mandate: but are often absent in relation to other
corporations.7,13 Responding to Suzuki and colleagues’
question about what should be included in consultation and
decision-making over health policy, we would suggest: (a)
having an independent committee to scrutinise participation,
(b) due-diligence of civil society participants, as industry
funding may constitute a conflict of interest, (c) including a
human rights approach to health, (d) mapping the inclusion
and omission of proposed changes and reasons for including/
dismissing them. Some of these can enable non-industry
participants to gain and maintain a loud voice, regardless of
the private sectors’ permanent and powerful participation.
Unless there continues to be a push for the implementation
of clear definitions, tools and actions against corporate
influence, and unless evidence on its effectiveness becomes

stronger, the agenda on COI risks being overshadowed/
overtaken by principles set by existing PPPs,14 particularly in
the face of constant pressure from the unhealthy commodities
to be part of the solution to NCDs and other health issues,
like COVID-19.15 More positively, several Member States
such as Chile, Mexico, South Africa, and Thailand (notably
sugar sweetened beverage taxation and food warning labels),
highlight that bold public health policies can be advanced,
despite pushback from commercial interests. Conversely, the
centrality of multi-stakeholderism to the United Nations Food
Systems Summit, in which transnational food companies such
have played a central role, and widely opposed by civil society
groups and schoolars,3 illustrates the wider significance and
the risks posed by Suzuki et al and further discussed in this
commentary.
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